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(E.S.T.)

TOWARDS A DISCERNING INTERNATICNALISM

Three weeks have gone by since the Presidential
elections.

That unique American happening illustrates a subtle

difference between your profession and mine .

I think of chemists

as being engaged in the arrangement and rearrangement of certain
natural elements.

This process,on occasion, produces an extra-

ordinary result which is then passed on by unawed scientists to
an awed public.
In a similar fashion, politicans are engaged in
the arrangement and rearrangement of certain political elements.
This process--the electoral process--on occasion, also produces
an extraordinary result.

In this instance, however, an unawed

public then passes on the outcome to awed politicans.
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While differing from chemistry in this respect,
politics bears a sometime relationship to alchemy.

Both share

the expectation, for example, that, by obscure and closely-guarded
techniques, gold can be produced from lesser metals.

The affinity

between them is seen in large part through the mysterious mechanism of the electoral college count.

On the recent election night,

the computers appeared to be yielding, first one, and then another
President and, at one point, even a non-President.

Finally,

Walter Cronkhite, Chet Huntley and other commentators managed to
extract Presidential material of electoral college acceptability
but of only

43.5% public purity.
As a Democrat, I must acknowledge that this result

was synthesized with great skill by the Republican Party.

In their

haste to gain the Presidency, however, the Republicans scarcely
touched the bedrock of the substantial Democratic ma jorities in
the Senate and the House of Representatives .

I am happy to assure

you, therefore, that the Republic still stands.
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In serious retrospect the recent election amounted
to a near-miss which brought the nation to the edge of Constitutional chaos.

It revealed most of the shortcomings of the system

under which the President of the United States is chosen.

Not only

did it demonstrate the possibility of a break in continuity in the
popular selection of the President, it also made clear that the
nation could be left with an uncertain interregnum in the most
vital single office in the land.

The makeshift could last . a day,

a week, a month, or indefinitely--however long might be required
for the House of Representatives to choose a Constitutionally
qualified Chief Executive.
To be sure, the flaws in the system have been known
for a long time.

For a long time, however, we have tended to re-

gard them as amusing anachronisms.

It is time to recognize them

for what they are, a source of great political mischief and a
potenti a l threat to the nation's stability.
One has only t o think of the current difficulties
in the nation's cities t o recognize the dangers in the creaking

- 4 electoral structure.

An uncerta i nty in the Presidency would

inject doubt ard delay into what has become a vital federal role
in maintaining a measure of orderly life in these regions .

A

President's decisions, for example, set the course for dealing
with such problems as air and water pollution.

They delineate

the approach in rebuilding and developing mass transit structures
and extending roa d systems.

What a President concludes has a great

deal to do with the education, the medical care, the feeding, the
housing, the security and countless other aspects of the sheer
physical and social well-being of tens of millions of Americans.
The dangers in the current system a re seen to be
even more striking in terms of the nation's relations with the rest
of the world.

To i llustrate the point, I would note Alfred Nobel's

partially erroneous anal ysis of the bright promise of dynamite.
Three-quarters of a century ago, he said of his explosives factories that they "may make an end of war sooner than your
Congresses," and ad ded,

'The day when two army corps can annihilate

each other in one second, all civilized nations, it is to be hoped,
will rec oil from war and discharge their troops.

11
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As do most of us, he underrated other professions
and overrated his own .

It is true that extraordinary progress has

been achieved by science in cutting the countdown to doomsday.

We

have reached a point, as you know, of instant annihilation not only
of opposing army corps but of entire nations.
Nobel's forecast was most accurate.
prophecy.

In that sense, Alfre

So, too, was his humanistic

In the second half of the 20th Century, it has, indeed,

become characteristic of civilized peoples to recoil from rather
than glorify war.

Where Nobel's 19th Century expectation strayed

from 20th Century reality, however, is in its political aspect-in his expectation that civilized nations would dj_scharge their
armies in consequence of the scientific multiplication of the
horrors of military conflict.
War has been made only unfashionable by destructive
capacity raised to the nth power; it has not been made impossible .
On more than one occasion since Hiroshima and Nagasaki the world
has approached the ultimate disaster of nuclear conflict.

Indeed,

this nation alone has lost tens of thousands of dead in two substantial conflicts since the explosions which, by Nobel's

- 6 calculations, certainly qualified as final inhibitors of war.
Civilized nations have gone from dynamj_te to denunciation of war
but have stopped short of disarmament.
Today, the prospect of mutual annihilation, as
Nobel anticipated, may be a factor in preserving a temporary truce
of terror.

As between total destruction and total peace, however,

it is still possible for nations to opt irrationally or to stumble
into the former.

In any durable sense, then, the nation's

securit~

and the world's safety are likely to lie elsewhere than in a continuous game of nuclear one-upmanship.

In this connection, it is

to be noted that the ballistics-missile race of the fifties promise :
to lead to a competition in anti-ballistics systems in the late
sixties.

I suppose that at some point in time this second com-

petition will phase into a third--into an anti-anti-ballistics
race.

And so a succession of antis may be expected to grow in a

deadly continuum.

I dread the thought that somewhere, someone

may lose track of a prefix ; then the fat will really be in the
fire.
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f~ct

i s that we are a part of a world structure

which--so long as the game of nuclear one-upmanship goes on-remains in its entirety on the razor's edge of oblivion.

Any

dura ble security that we may expect to khow in these years o f our
times is likely to be found elsewhere than in military compet ition
pushed to the point of absurdity.

It is likely to lie, rather,

in a creative foreign pol i cy which builds somewhat more on the
human wil l to live and rather less on the human fea r of ext i nct ion
It i s likely to lie in strengthening the '' thin line ' of reason
and restraint which, so to speak, lies between Nobel's opposing
a rmy corps.

The world can well use agreements, a ct ions and

i n i t iatives which tend t o diminish rather than augment this tens e
and fea r-laden confronta t ion.

The nuclear test ban treaty which

wa s negotiated in the Kennedy Admini strat ion is relevant j_n this
connection.

The Nuclear Non-Pro liferation Treaty whi ch was

negot i ated i n the Johnson Administration and ha s the endorsement
of the President-elect, I believe, c ontai ns s omething of the same
promise .

Certainly, its consideration will be among the first

items of business in the Senate of the next Congress.

- 8 If a less tenuous peace is a requisite for civilized survival, a creative foreign policy may well be the prime
instrument for its achievement.

Subject to the advice and consent

of the Senate and other Congressional checks, the President is
charged with carrying on the nation's relations with the rest of
the world.

He is the key constitutional figure in maintaining

and strengthening peace.

It is not difficult, therefore, to

comprehend the significance of a continuj.ty in the office--a
continuity which i.s jeopardized by the present electoral system .
A President may place a unique stamp upon policy,
but the broad pattern within which he exercises his authority
is not broken from administration to administration.

Ra ther,

the pattern is determined by the unfolding of developments elsewhere in the world.

It is determined, too, by the nation's

general response and the specific responses of the Executive
Branch of the government to these developments.

The intera ct i.on

of these several elements is a complex process.

I am persuade0,

however, that what emerges as the "international situation ' does
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Presidential election.

The situation does change to be sure,

but it is not subject to miraculous or overnight change.

Indeed,

from the point of view of international stability, it is best
that changes be neither abrupt nor drastic.

Nor are they likely

to be unless significant and necessary adjustments of policy
have been too long delayed.
It seems to me most commendable that Mr. Johnson
and Mr. Nixon have recogn i zed the essential continuity of this
aspect of the Presidency.

A smooth transfer of responsibility

over the nation's foreign policy is especially needed at this
time because the effort to achieve peace in Viet Nam has reached
a most difficult stage.

It is also needed because on a much

broader scale than Viet Nam the flow of international events
and the nation's general response to them are now in major transit ion.

In my judgment, this period of change

v

beg~n

during the

incumbent administration; barring overwhelming developments
abroad, it is not likely to be reversed in the next.

It is as
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though there has been reached an ebb in the great tide of our
involvement in world affairs after World War II.
To clarify the point, I would note that over the
past quarter of a century the nation's concerns have been thrust
outward from the continental limits in every direction.

We have

moved into wide new contacts--economic, cultural, scientific and
political and military contacts--with all parts of the world.
The foreign policy by which this massive outward projection has
been channeled is usually termed internationalism and in recent
decades that designation has been clothed with a certain intrinsic
and automatic virtue.

The policy for which it stands, therefore,

is set apart from a predecessor which is labeled tsolationism and
to which considerably less virtue is ascribed.
Both internationalism and isolationism, however,
a re words from an old war of words.
meaning they may once have had.

They have lost whatever useful

The new world in which we live

gives us no rational choice between the one and the other.

We are

compelled--all nations are compelled--by the facts of contemporary
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life on this planet into a close and continuing contact.

It

matters little what we choose to call a policy which is based
on this reality.

However, we can ignore the reality in policy

only at great peril to ourselves and to the world.
May I say to you who are scientists, that the
propagation of the scientific method has probably been the major
element in bringing about this fundamental change in the nature
of our relations with the rest

~f

the world.

Science has raised

universal hopes and is now busy finding ways to bring about their
fulfillment.

Immense improvements in communications and trans-

portation are drawing all nations into the mainstream of contemporary life.

At the same time, the interdependency of all

peoples has grown and continues to grow.

In all the continents,

science has cut the death rates and lengthened the life span,
thus greatly increasing not only human numbers but the complexity
of the physical and social problems of human survival and fulfillment.
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That is the setting in which contemporary foreign
policy must function.

It is not too much to say that our national

well-being has now become inseparable from a constructive participation in world affairs.

Indeed, our very existence as a

people may well depend upon such participation.

To put it

bluntl~

the rest of the world needs us but we also need it.
This dual consideration has been present in the
policies whi ch we have pursued since World War II.

On the one

hand, the Marshal Plan and other aid programs have been charged
with an unprecedented measure of international altruism.

They

have also derived rationale, however, from what was or, certainly,
what was believed to be in the essential self-interest of this
nation.
After World War II we saw ourselves emerge almost
unscathed in a world of nations which lay largely in ruin, neglect, and exhaustion.

We also sensed ourselves as an island of

plenty in a sea of poverty--in a sea which could submerge us if
it were not made to recede.

We saw ourselves strengthened by

- 13 expanded military capacity and by the immense accretion of
nuclear power.

We also saw ourselves in need of reliable friends

and allies, as the Sovi et Union, too, grew strong in the postwar
years.
The inadequacies of the U. N. peace keeping
structure led us to seek other ways to protect a security which
we found endangered, first, by the Soviet Union, then by China,
and, eventually, by upheavals or unrest almost anywhere on the
globe, even in places which we had scarcely heard of before the
war.

In short, our post World War II policies have responded

to others on the planet not only with sympathy, interest and
support; they have also responded to the rest of the world, out
of a doubt, distrust and disillusion born of the failure of the
second great war to be followed by a stable and reliable peace.
This dichotomous response to the world has been
expressed through traditional diplomacy and through the new
diplomacy of wide participation in international organizations.

- 14 In more costly forms, the response has also involved great unilateral expenditures for foreign aid, the weaving of a great net
of military alliances and immense outlays for the national defense establishment.

Since World War II, for example, we have

been prompted to provide more than $130 billions in loans and
grants of aid to over 120 nations.

We have been led to commit

ourselves to some form of military action under multilateral
defense alliances and bilateral arrangements with 42 nations.
In the same period, moreover (1946-1968), a never-ending search
for a more secure security--the redundancy is apt--has led us
to appropriate in the neighborhood of a trillion dollars for our
defense establishment.
As I noted at the outset, however, the broad
pattern of these policies has been in transition for some months.
We have reached and receded from an apex of postwar international
involvement.

It is not possible to pinpoint a single cause or

moment of change.

Certainly, the bitter frustrations of the

conflict in Viet Nam have been a factor.

This barbarous war
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In a

larger sense, however, it is a quarter of a century after World
War II and it is beginning to come clear that the tenor of the
world situation has changed significantly.

Once, many nations

were heavily dependent upon the United States for survival and,
once, our surplus capacity to help was great.
was almost no

In truth, there

other place for great segments of a prostrate

Europe and Asia to turn except to the United States and this
nation responded most readily and generously.

Now the rationale

for assuming heavy one-sided responsibilities for the survival,
security and stability of others has disappeared and, so too,
I might add has much of the wherewithal.
Within the nation, too, there has been great
change over the past qua rter of a century.

It is change which

has come faster than our capacity and will i ngness to confront
the problems of change .

It is not surprising therefore that a

growing uneasiness about the inner state of the nation has been
evident in the Senate and the Congress for some time.

It is
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American people as a whole.
There is, indeed, a deepening concern lest an
excessive fixation on the situation abroad has deflected attention, energy and resources from the ris ·· ng tides of difficulty
at home.

There has been ground for anxiety, too, that great

budgetary deficits and a persistent imbalance of international
payments have flashed warnings of an over-extension abroad which
have not been adequately heeded.
Indeed, it may well be that the search for an
elusive military security has led us too far afield and into
costly activities of questionable relevancy in many parts of the
world.

It may well be that we have even tended in recent years

to probe for threats in regions in which none existed.

There

can be disturbances elsewhere, after all, which do not concern
us directly.

There can be threats which are not to our peace

alone but to the peace of many nations and a unilateral attempt
on our part to guard against them may do more harm than good.
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situation.

Nevertheless, a year and a half ago, this nation

did touch the edges of unilateral involvement in the Congo.
In lengthening retrospect, moreover, I am persuaded that the
Asian mainland as distinct from the Pacific Ocean regions (in
which our interests, indeed, are broad and intense) will be seen
as also confronting us with something of the same kind of situation.
In short, what is becoming clear in the present
transition, is that we are neither the world's policeman nor
its only prop.
structure.
great

Rather, we are a part of a loose international

In some respects, our role in its maintenance is of

im~ortance.

of one among many.

In others, our

signific~nce

is less, or that

The important point, however, is clear;

this nation alone can neither sustain nor shape the entirety
or even the preponderance of the international structure nor
is it in the interests of this nation to try to do so.
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have begun to reflect this real i ty more faithfully.

Largely

on the initiatives of the Congress, for example, the foreign
aid program has been progress i vely reduced in recent years.
For the current fiscal year, less than $2 billion has been
appropriated--the lowest allocation in many years.

Moreover,

the administrat i on of foreign affairs i s be i ng streaml i ned by
sha rp reductions in the size of the offic i al overseas esta blishments of the United Sta tes government.

As of the f i rst of the

year, there were 22,000 American government employees abroad.
With cuts whi ch Pres i dent J ohns on has a lrea dy ordered, the
number will have been reduced 4,000 by the end of next June.
These figures, of course, a re exclus i ve of the organized U. S.
military components abroad which rema in enormous and concentra t ed
i n two great clusters.

The vortex of Vi et Nam , f or exam ple, ha s

drawn three qua rters of a mill ion Amer i can forces i nto and
around Southeast Asia .

In Euro pe, pursua nt t o the c ommitment

to NATO, the number of American military personnel a nd dependents
exceeds half a million.

- 19 If signs of restraint are apparent in the
administrative machinery of policy, they are also to be seen
in its substance.

The change is evident in Viet Nam.

It should

be recalled in this connection that Viet Nam was a minor concern
of this nation scarcely a decade and a half ago.

Nevertheless,

the involvement grew from commitment to commitment into the
massive

eff~rt

which it now is and which, a year ago, had U. S.

planes bomb i ng within 10 seconds of China.

By the ruthless

logic of warfare, moreover, U. S. forces on the ground, from
coastal bases, had been edged northwards towards the other Viet
Nam and westward to Cambodia and Laos.

The fires of conflict

were spreading- - if not towards war with China--at least towards
a war which would engulf Southeast Asia and require hundreds of
thousands of additional American forces.
President Johnson has managed, apparently, to
halt and reverse this ever-d eepening enmeshment.

In my judgment,

he has now laid the basis for an honorable termination of the
war without increasing the jeopardy to the men who are already
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committed to Viet Nam and to whom, regardless of policy, we owe
a national obligation.

In this effort, he has had the full

support of the leadership of the Senate, both democratic and
republican and much of its membership .

That support, I

am

persuaded, reflects the deepest sentiments of the people of the
nation who want the war in Viet Nam ended promptly and honorably.
Until such t i me, as that can be done, moreover,
it seems to me that our policies in Viet Nam should continue to
be brought increasingly into l i ne with the limited interests of
the United States in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia and into better
consonance with our great worldwide interests .

That is a way of

saying that the conflict should come t o be treated in policy as
it is in fact -- a s a struggle which is of preponderant concern
to the Vietnamese themselves.

In this connection, I would note

that President Johnson has po i nted out that the United States has
no need of permanent military bases, not merely in Viet Nam but,
for that matter, anywhere else in Southeast Asia.
with

that judgment,

I concur fully

Moreover, the sooner that circumstances
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are developed which permit us to carry it into pract i ce, the
better for this nation and for all concerned.
The negotiations which are the essential prerequisite for terminating the war in Viet Nam have been joined
during the current administration.

In initiating them, the

President has had very substantial support from the Senate as
well as from the President-elect.

As the effort to negotiate

a settlement in Viet Nam continues into the next administration,
I am confident that the new President can expect a continuance
of support from the Democratic majority as well as the Republican
minority in the Senate.
May I say that it is not only with respect to
negotiating a termination of the war in Viet Nam that such support will be forthcoming.

Other adjustments in foreign

relation~

as I have noted, are already in progress and they are likely to
continue into the next administration.

Insofar as the Democratic

majority is concerned, I am confident, for example, that there
will be Senate support for continued efforts :
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l.

To streamline the administration of the

nation's foreign affairs abroad ;
2.

To cut the lavish use of military resources

and manpower overseas on the basis of greater efficiency, improve(
technology and changing circumstances abroad;

3.

To lighten our burdens under NATO and to

strengthen and update the organization by bringing about a
relatively greater European contribution of manpower and resources and increased European responsibility in the direction
and management of the organization's affairs;

4.

To reduce further the outflow of American

resources in the form of military and other

fore~ ·gn

aid to areas

and nations where the value of these outlays as a contribution
to peace is marginal at best;

5.

To revitalize diplomacy in both its older and

newer forms, to the end that there will be evoked a greater
initi~tive

and effort from all nations in bearing the burdens and

responsibilities f o r the world's security and well-being.
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In short, in these and in other ways there will
be support in the next Senate for an administration whose policies respond increasingly to the world as it is today, not as it
was a decade ago, much less as it was a quarter of a century
ago.

Above all, there is a need for a full recognition that the

nation is endangered by the accumulation of problems at home
as well as by pressures which may emanate from abroad.

There

can no longer be, therefore, as there has been in the past, an
automatic priori ty for whatever may carry the related hallmarks
of interna t i onalism and defense.

Henceforth, we must examine

most closely beneath these labels because in these matters, as
in any others, a ll that glitters i s not necessarily gold.
Wha t i s needed, i n short, i s a finer sense of
discernment in foreign affairs.

The need is for a discerning

i nternat i onalism, i f you wi ll, whi ch will permit us t o l i mit
our underta ki ng s abroa d t o those whi ch promise a reasonable
contri but i on t o internati onal security and progress.

A discern-

ing internationalism will not inhibit us in cooperating with
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others in confronting the great range of problems and possibilities of economic and social progress.

It will not prevent us

from giving a greater emphasis to an international effort to
realize more fully the potentials of science, trade and other
human endeavors for the enrichment of the human experience.
Rather, a discerning internationalism will permit us to work
with others, to build in common that which cannot be built by us
alone or by any other nation alone--a vital, a progressive, and
a peaceful world order.

